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In 1973, team owners in Major League Baseball’s American League voted in 
favor of introducing the designated hitter into their offensive lineups. The National 
League owners voted against such a rule change that year and since on several different 
occurrences.  Baseball fans, sportswriters, players, owners, economists and others have 
weighed in on the impact of the designated hitter rule change on Major League Baseball. 
Chapter One of this paper reviews recent published writings by economists on the impact 
of the designated hitter. Team owners gave several reasons for advocating the dramatic 
designated rule change in the American League. Chapter Two considers each of these 
reasons and compares them against actual statistical data to determine accuracy of team 
owner foresight. In other words, after 36 seasons of the designated hitter, did American 
League owners’ landmark decision achieve its intended goals? Chapter Three takes the 
previous chapter arguments and tests several variables that resulted from the DH ruling 
against attendance.  Chapter Four suggests several points of interest that appear to be 
unresolved in the existing economic DH literature. This paper considers the impact of the 
DH on offense, defense and attendance in Major League Baseball. In the end, attendance 
gains appear to strengthen the argument that American League owners were acting 




Even the symmetrical, monochromatic Kingdome could not prevent Edgar 
Martinez from making the stand-up double a thing of beauty. It wasn’t only the towering 
roof of the concrete cylinder stadium that overshadowed the game’s best designated 
hitter. Hall of Famers passed through Seattle like spring rain clouds during late 1980’s 
into the mid 1990’s. In fact, first ballot future Hall of Famers Ken Griffey Jr., Randy 
Johnson and Alex Rodriguez all spent their early careers playing for the Mariners 
alongside Martinez. But for the true M’s fan – as I was and still am – no one was more 
important to the team or the fans than Edgar. The city of Seattle aptly named a street after 
him adjacent to the newly constructed the new Safeco Field, the Mariners new home. 
When the votes are next cast for introduction into baseball immortality, Edgar Martinez’s 
name should join the pantheon of other deserving inductees into the Major League 




The final result of this work was a team effort. The scope and content of the paper 
was overseen by Dr. Robert Tollison. In addition, Dr. Robert McCormick was 
instrumental in pointing me toward the economics of sport many years ago. I am grateful 
to Dr. William Dougan for first inviting me to be part of the Clemson Economics 
department. The committee overseeing the quality of this work includes Dr. Raymond 
Sauer and Dr. Michael Maloney. Special recognition is warranted here to Dr. Maloney; 
his leadership provided the way for ultimate completion of this work. And to my wife and 
daughters, thank you.    
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When Ron Blomberg stepped into the batter’s box on April 6, 1973, it began the 
most controversial at bat in baseball history. His plate appearance was the culmination of 
decades of debate that extended throughout virtually every level of organized baseball.  
Despite garnering an unceremonious walk, Blomberg’s first appearance as a “designated 
pinch hitter”
 1
 continues to incite hearty disagreement to this day. Thirty seven years 
later, the institution of the designated hitter (DH) into the American League is the most 
fiercely debated rule change in professional sports history.   
It would not have happened had the outcome of a single vote gone differently. On 
January 11, 1973, the twelve owners of the American League of Major League Baseball 
voted in favor of instituting a three year experiment of the designated pinch hitter. 
Following this landmark 8-4 vote, the Major League Baseball Rule Book (MLB 2008) 
added Rule 6.10, stating that teams in the American League
2
 may designate a player to 
bat for the pitcher “without otherwise affecting the status of the pitcher”.  While there 
have been minor revisions to the designated hitter rule
3
, the essential tenets of the 
experiment have remained in tact – American League pitchers do not bat. What began as 
                                                 
1
 The designated hitter was originally called the designated pinch hitter or DPH. The term “designated” 
signified that managers would have to determine (designate) which player would begin each game as the 
designated hitter.     
2
 In the “rule of the park” decision in 1988, Baseball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth ruled that the 
designated hitter can be utilized when games are played at AL ballparks, but not when playing at NL parks. 
This would impact baseball’s All-Star Game, World Series and eventually inter-league play during the 
regular season. In the 1973-1975 seasons, the DH was not included in these contests. The 1976-1987 
seasons used the DH in alternating years for these games.  
3
 After the 1973 season, the Major League Baseball Playing Rules Committee mandated that the DH had to 
make at least one plate appearance. This was seen as a reaction to Baltimore Orioles manager Earl Weaver 
who routinely created a mystery spot in the lineup by assigning a player as DH, then replacing him with a 
more qualified hitter when they would come to bat.   
 2 
a three year trial period for the DH
4
 remains the defining difference between Major 
League Baseball’s (MLB) American and National Leagues (AL and NL respectively).   
While the DH decision by the AL was remarkable, it was not the first attempt by 
Major League Baseball to improve its offensive output. In 1968, the Leagues decided to 
lower the pitching mound, reduce the size of the strike zone
5
 and enforce “illegal” 
pitches. All three of these actions were decidedly in favor of the batter and were designed 
to boost slumping offenses.  The 1973 decision to institute the DH is widely believed to 
boost offense and strengthen the1968 rule changes.   
As for Blomberg, he was not the type of player owners had in mind when the DH 
rule change was instituted. At the time of his first plate appearance as a DH, he was 24 
years old, was not considered a defensive liability, and was on the front end of what was 
projected to be a promising career. His batter-only status that brisk Boston afternoon in 
1973 was a result of a hamstring pull during the Yankees spring training just days earlier. 
During the 1973 season, Blomberg routinely played on defense and was considered a 
second alternate DH to fellow teammate Jim Ray Hart. The 11 year veteran Hart was 
acquired by the Yankees from San Francisco and played 106 games at the position during 
the 1973 season (McKelvey 2004).   
 
                                                 
4
 AL owners agreed on a three year experiment of the DH from 1973-1975 seasons. After just one season, 
the AL owners made the decision permanent.   
5
 The size of the strike zone had been reduced in 1950 and then expanded in 1962 before again being 
reduced in 1968.  
 3 
CHAPTER ONE 
REVIEW OF THE DESIGNATED HITTER LITERATURE 
 
With the exception of the DH, rules in the AL and the NL remain essentially 
identical. Because of this near homogeneity, league to league comparison provides for a 
unique and fertile soil on which to conduct controlled experiments on the impact of DH.   
Several economists have analyzed the impact of the DH on hit batsman in Major 
League Baseball. Recent material has focused on the positive statistical correlation 
between the DH and hit batters. Two general reasons are given for why the DH invites 
higher levels of hit batsmen. First, AL pitchers are more likely to engage in risky 
behavior (resulting in hit batsmen) than their NL counterpart because they do not have to 
face personal retaliation for their behavior. In this case, retaliation is in the form of a 
quid-pro-quo plunking of a batter from the offending pitcher’s team or the offending 
pitcher. This theory is broadly defined as the “deterrence” hypothesis.  
A second explanation for the hit batsman is the “lineup composition” hypothesis. 
This theory simply explains that a DH represents another quality batter in the lineup. The 
DH acts as a superior offensive substitute to usually poor hitting pitchers. Since it is less 
costly to plunk a quality batter, a DH should more often be on the receiving end of a bean 
ball.   
Finally, a broader purpose of studying the behavior of pitchers when a DH is in 
the lineup is to offer evidence for the larger and very well-developed “moral hazard” 
theory first developed by Sam Peltzman in 1975. This theory postulates that when an 
actor is insulated from consequences resulting from his actions, the actor will behave 
differently than if he was not shielded from such consequences. In baseball, the moral 
 4 
hazard theory can most closely be observed when a DH prevents direct retaliation to the 
offending pitcher.    
The following is a sample of some of the key literature that considers the moral 
hazard theory along with the deterrence and lineup composition hypotheses of the DH.  
Goff, Shughart, and Tollison (GST 1997) 
 
In 1997, GST first examined data from 1901 to 1990 related to the impact of hit 
batsman prior to and then following the 1973 introduction of the DH. According to GST, 
AL batters had a 10-15% greater likelihood of getting hit by a pitch (when compared with 
the NL) following the DH rule change. Further extrapolating this information, GST 
explained that the introduction of the DH was tantamount to incentivizing hazardous 
behavior by removing the deterrent of pitchers to hit batters. In other words, pitchers 
were more likely to hit batters if they were not themselves subject to the fear physical 
harm as a result of direct retaliation. The work of GST would prompt a number of 
responses to the application of the moral hazard theory to pitcher behavior in Major 
League Baseball. Much of this dialogue related to GST’s work follows sequentially.   
Trandel, White, and Klein (TWK 1998)  
 
The work of TWK calls into question some of the conclusions drawn by GST 
about why AL hitters are more likely to be hit by pitches. Instead of focusing on the 
moral hazard basis for hit batsmen (GST), TWK introduces the lineup composition 
hypothesis to explain results in the period of 1947 to 1997. This hypothesis posits that the 
DH constitutes an additional quality hitter in each AL lineup. More talented hitters 
essentially cost less (conversely, provide a larger marginal benefit) to plunk when 
 5 
compared with less offensively productive players. In this case, pitchers can be assumed 
to be less offensively productive than their DH offensive replacement. In their analysis, 
TWK show that AL DH’s, “have been hit at about 110% the rate of other AL batters”. 
Conversely, poor hitting NL pitchers reach base at a far lower rate and are therefore most 
costly to plunk than their DH replacement.   
Levitt (Levitt 1998) 
 
In 1998, Stephen Levitt categorically disputes GST’s contention that the moral 
hazard theory can be seen in hit batsmen in Major League Baseball. Levitt calls into 
question the (apparent) correlation between a pitcher who hits a batter and a pitcher who 
himself gets hit. Agreeing with and further refining the lineup composition arguments of 
TWK, Levitt resolves that the instances of pitchers being on the receiving end of bean 
balls are so few that it becomes statistically inconclusive to tie any meaningful retaliation 
conclusions. Using data from 1993 to 1996 MLB seasons, Levitt sees no correlation 
between a pitcher giving and then receiving a plunking. Ultimately, the author seeks to 
diminish GST’s deterrence or moral hazard arguments related to pitchers engaging in 
riskier behaviors as a result of the DH.  
Goff, Shughart, and Tollison (GST 1998) 
 After lineup composition arguments by TWK and Levitt that sought to neutralize 
the moral hazard theory proposed by GST, the authors return to update their previous 
work. Prior analytical framework is clarified and data beyond the original 1990 period.   
This expanded period (1991 through 1997 MLB seasons) constituted a prolific period for 
bean balls. The authors postulate that NL league expansion in 1993 followed on the heels 
 6 
of strike-shortened seasons and pre-seasons of 1994 and 1995 (respectively) may have 
had some impact on these results. The authors reaffirm their contention that better hitting 
(i.e. the lineup composition hypothesis) does not explain the increased number of hit 
batsmen in the American League.  
Trandel (Trandel 2004) 
 
Gregory Trandel describes the similarities and differences in the previous 
arguments made by GST and TWK. In both points of view, there appears to be some 
agreement that retaliation behavior is present in Major League Baseball . In fact, 
retaliation is of central importance for Trandel when determining the DH/hit batsmen 
relationship. The author focuses his data set from several discrete decades to determine if 
teams’ pitcher’s hit batsmen is related to their being on the receiving in of getting hit. 
While there is not proof that retaliation is absent from MLB pitcher behavior, Trandel 
found little demonstrable evidence of pitcher-on-pitcher retaliation behavior. Further, the 
author hoped to steer future inquisitors to focus more on detecting retaliation rather than 
further discussion of retaliation methods.  
Bradbury and Drinen (BD 2006, 2007) 
 
The most recent substantive published work to address the issue of hit batsman 
following the DH rule change is by Bradbury and Drinen, 2007. The authors offer the 
most complete summary and critical commentary of previous publications on the impact 
of the DH on hit batters. Against these previous publications, BD offers some alternative 
explanations for pitcher behavior not previously discussed in the related literature.  
 7 
Specifically, instead of charging further into the debated explanations of increased 
hit batters as a result of the DH (deterrence versus lineup composition hypotheses), BD 
focuses on the situational-driven decisions of pitchers as they determine the value and 
cost of engaging in riskier behavior.  
By bringing game-level data into the hit batsmen discussion, BD sought to reduce 
the data aggregation necessary to draw conclusions related to the impact of the DH on hit 
batsmen. According to the authors, aggregation of the infrequent occurrence of direct 
retribution against pitchers results in a problem of data reliability. Said another way, 
pitchers rarely and infrequently hit batters (approximately 1% of all plate appearances 
result in a hit batsman) and pitchers are themselves (in retaliation) hit even less 
frequently. Trying to aggregate and then exact quality conclusions out of such infrequent 
occurrences presents a challenge to studying the impact of the DH on hit batsmen. By 
using a play-by-play analysis of MLB data, the authors seek to counter this aggregation 
problem.  
Using micro-level data, the authors reach several conclusions. First, pitchers are 
statistically more likely to hit batters with the presence of a DH in the lineup. Second, 
there is also support for the GST deterrence hypothesis. For example, BD shows that 
pitchers are four times more likely to be plunked in the half inning following their hitting 
a batter. In general, when compared to non-pitchers, pitchers are 55% more likely to be 
hit than non-pitchers. This is a compelling argument to support the GST deterrence 
hypothesis. Likewise, non-pitchers who bat immediately following a teammate’s 
homerun are 32% more likely to be hit than those who do not follow a fence-clearing 
 8 
shot. Third, inferior pitcher quality (measured by a higher walk ratio and batter OPS
6
) 
increases the likelihood of pitchers hitting batters.  Fourth, base runners and the score 
differential are positively correlated with hit batsmen. Fifth, off-field punishment (fines 
and suspensions) have served only to “increase the incidence of hit batters” according to 
the authors. Finally, the lineup composition hypothesis proposed by TWK and Levitt, “is 
not sufficient to explain the entire impact of the DH on hit batters”.  
Across the literature, there is a general agreement that the introduction of the DH 
has produced more hit batsmen. The moral hazard theory appears to be supported as a 
likely reason for such behavior. The lineup composition may also contribute to the 
number of hit batsmen, but does not fully explain the behavior of pitchers. Further areas 
of proposed study using similar data related to hit batsmen and the DH are suggested in a 
later section of this paper.  
 
                                                 
6
 OPS is calculated by adding together on base percentage and slugging percentage 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REASONS BEHIND THE RULE CHANGE AND THE RESULTS 
 
Lee MacPhail was the General Manager of the New York Yankees in 1972 and 
went on to become the President of the American League from 1974-1984. In a written 
response to author G. Richard McKelvey, MacPhail explained why he supported the DH,   
 
“I can tell you advantages we felt it would accomplish. First, it would 
increase the offense of each team. Second, it would enable some clubs to 
retain a player, important in the club’s past, who possibly was no longer 
able to do the job defensively. Finally, clubs would not have to remove 
pitcher for pinch hitters. All of these, we felt, justified the rule change.”  
 
The above statement by MacPhail will serve as the guideline for Chapter II. The 
rationale given by AL owners for the DH rule change will be compared against the actual 
impact of the DH.  There appears to be four primary reasons for the AL owners’ decision 
to institute the DH in 1973. They included:     
1. The DH will increase the offensive output of teams in the AL by adding another 
talented batter in the lineup 
2. Marquee starting pitchers could pitch more innings and not be removed from 
games to insert a temporary pinch hitter  
3. Aging players with quality offensive talent would be able to play longer without 
inflicting negative defensive costs on their teams  
4. Increased attendance  
 10 
Each of these four justifications will be explored in the following section to determine 
what impact the DH ruling may have actually had on offenses, defenses and attendance.  
It should be noted that maximizing revenues via attendance is assumed here to be 
the most important element of this rule change and indeed any professional sports 
organization. As a result, each of the above variables will be measured against attendance 
(a proxy for team revenues) to determine their statistical relationships. 
Of note, the analysis in this paper covers the 1901-2008 seasons. For comparison 
purposes, the available data is sourced from Baseball Reference (2009).  Seasonal data 
has been broken into three equal periods of 36 years for purposes of analysis.  
 
“Period 1” 1901-1936 MLB seasons 
“Period 2” 1937-1972 MLB seasons 
“Period 3” 1973-2008 MLB seasons 
 
Of particular note, Period 3 encompasses the 36 years following the 1973 AL 
adoption of the DH rule.   
Prior to the 1973 DH rule change, all rules were essentially the same in the AL 
and the NL. For purposes of analysis, the DH rule is considered the last significant rule 
change in Major League Baseball. As a result, the NL and the AL are placed side-by-side 
for comparative purposes. The goal is to objectively measure the impact of the DH on 
runs per game (R), complete games (CG), batter age (BatAge) and attendance (Attend).   
Reason 1: Increased Offensive Output 
 
In response to the DH decision in 1973, Yankees General Manager Lee MacPhail 
famously said, “I never got a thrill out of watching a pitcher hit.” By taking pitchers out 
 11 
of the batting lineup, American League teams believed they would produce a superior 
product by increasing the offensive output of their teams.    
The decision to institute a DH was formally considered several times by team 
owners in past meetings. What caused the AL owners to take action in 1973? One reason 
was the NL had scored more runs than the AL in seven of eight seasons leading up to the 
1973 rule change. The 1972 season proved particularly anemic for the AL offenses (see 
Table 2.1). Only 3 of the previous 70 seasons had been worse offensively for the AL. By 
comparison, the NL averaged nearly a half a run per game more than the AL in the 1972 
season. As a result, the AL believed the NL was drawing more fans by producing a 
superior product - offensive excitement.    
What happened to offensive production in the AL after the DH ruling? Since 
1973, both the AL and NL have experienced a sustained positive growth rate
7
 in runs per 
game. When compared to Period 2 (1937-1972), AL R in Period 3 (1973-2008) grew by 
an average of 1/3 of a run per game. Raw comparisons between the NL and AL show that 
the AL has scored more R than the NL in 35 of the 36 years since the DH rule change
8
.      
                                                 
7
 “Growth Rate” here is synonymous with compound average growth rate (CAGR). This is a smoothed 
measurement often used to calculate gain or loss over a specified time horizon. The exact calculation is 
achieved by taking the nth root of the total percentage growth rate where n is the number of years being 
calculated.  
8
 The 1974 season was the only season in Period 3 where the NL averaged more R than the AL 
 12 
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The superior offensive output of the AL meaningfully demonstrates that the 
decision to include the DH in AL lineups improved offensive production in the league
9
. 
The impact on attendance of this DH-fueled offensive improvement will be discussed 
later.   
Reason 2: Marquee Starting Pitchers Yield Longer Starts 
 
Starting pitchers are assumed to be the most talented on any team’s pitching staff. 
As a result, AL owners reasoned that it would be a positive outcome if these pitchers 
lasted longer in games – fans would stick around in later innings. The statistic of 
“Complete Games” (CG) is used here as a relevant measurement of pitcher in-game 
                                                 
9
 Average runs per game were used due to the variability in number of games played due to teams being 




. It is hypothesized that AL pitchers should compile more CG than their NL 
counterparts following the DH rule change for two reasons. First, NL managers are 
forced to make decisions to insert pinch hitters who replace starting pitchers as a stronger 
bat in the lineup. Rules in the NL state that inserting a pinch hitter in place of a pitcher 
must be followed by the replacement of that pitcher.     
Second, pitchers in the AL would spend no practice time or in-game energy on 
offensive participation. In other words, pitchers in the AL would not take practice batting 
or exert any energy during game when batting and running the bases. This specialization 
was expected to yield better results and longevity from starting pitchers.    
American League starting pitchers should have an advantage in CG when 
compared to their NL counterparts. However, there were developments in the game that 
served to limit this superiority. First, the increased role of specialized relief pitchers in 
both leagues has continued to erode the number of times starting pitchers last for a full 
nine innings (see Table 2.3). Second, Major League Baseball clubs have moved from 4 to 
5 man pitching rotations in the last several decades.  As duration between starts increases,  
the number of actual starts decreases for pitchers over a season. As total number of starts 
falls, the opportunities for pitchers to pitch a complete game decreases.
11
  
Results show that there have been sustained negative rates of CG over the 72 
years prior to 1973 in both the AL & NL. However, post 1973, (the DH era) appears to 
coincide with a significant decline in CG across both leagues.  
                                                 
10
 Modern baseball tracks a statistic called “quality starts” that may be a better measure of starting pitcher 
in-game longevity. A quality start is defined as a starting pitcher lasting six or more innings and allows 
three or fewer runs. However, this data is not available in earlier years.   
11
 Certainly there could be an argument made for pitchers who throw less can last longer when they do 
start. However, this does not appear to be an argument used by any noted publication.  
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Table 2.2: Compound Average Growth Rates in Complete Games (CG) 
 
     AL  NL 
Period 1 -1.68% -1.83% 
   Period 2 -1.45% -1.01% 
   Period 3 -6.54% -7.17% 
 
 
In other words, the observable trend in MLB appears to be that starting pitchers 
lasting nine innings (CG) is decreasingly likely. This is shown in Table 2.2 as a negative 
compound average growth rate. Of particular note is the large difference in (negative) 
growth rates from Period 2 to Period 3. Both the AL and the NL have seen steep declines 
in CG since 1973. The AL’s decline has been only slightly slower in Period 3 than the 
NL’s decline (-6.54% vs. – 7.17%).
12
  
Despite facing a more potent offensive lineup that includes a DH (TWK 1998), it 
appears that AL starting pitchers have been able to pitch CG slightly more often than the 
NL since 1973.
13
 The importance of the CG in relation to attendance will be discussed 
later.     
                                                 
12
 Over the 1901-2008 period, NL CG CAGR was -3.53%, AL CG CAGR was -3.13% 
13
 Average number of complete games per game were used due to 1) the variability in number of games 
played over the time periods, 2) number of teams being added to the league, 3) teams changing leagues and 
4) strike shortened seasons 
 15 



























































































































Reason 3: Increased Longevity for Productive Offensive Players 
 
The AL owners believed that they could employ popular, established batters for 
more seasons by adding a DH position to the offensive lineup. By adding a hitting-only 
option for talent, the 1973 rule change was expected to allow popular players struggling 
with defensive responsibilities to continue playing. Owners surely had in mind to extend 
the careers of great players like Frank Robinson, Orlando Cepeda, Al Kaline and Hank 
Aaron. In other words, employment in baseball would be easier in the AL for these aging 
legends with suffering defensive skills.  
After the DH introduction, did the AL begin to employ older players more 
frequently than in the NL? To determine the impact of the DH decision on batters age, 
 16 
the average age of batters in the AL and NL was used. Comparisons between the AL and 
NL were employed to determine the significance of the rule change on AL batters.  




























 Major League Baseball Seasons
NL Avg Bat Age
AL Avg Bat Age
 
 
Results from Table 2.4 indicate that the raw average age of an AL batter has 
increased from Period 2 (pre-DH) to Period 3 (post-DH). However, NL batters’ age has 
grown at a faster rate during this time. Using average age in the 36 years pre and post DH 
(Periods 2 and 3), AL batters are 110 days and NL batters are 167 days older in Period 3 
than they were in Period 2. This would indicate that the AL did not disproportionately 
employ older batters following the DH rule change. 
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Reason 4: Increased Attendance 
 
In the three seasons leading up to the DH decision, the NL drew 36% more fans to 
their ballparks than their AL counterparts. Of the twelve AL teams, 8 were said to have 
lost money in 1972 (McKelvey 2004). Because professional baseball is presumably a for-
profit enterprise, increased team revenue is considered an important reason for the AL 
adoption of the DH.  
Did the DH experiment boost AL attendance? The answer appears nuanced with 
several areas to consider. First, the number of teams in the AL and the NL are not always 
equal. From 1901-1960 each league had eight teams. In Period 2, the NL and AL grew 
their number of teams at the same rate
14
. Unlike the previous two periods, Period 3 (the 
DH era), the AL and NL had the same number of teams in just 9 out of 36 seasons. Raw 
totals show that the league with the most number of teams had the highest attendance in 
each of these unbalanced 27 years. In years where there was parity in the number of 
teams, the NL outdrew the AL in 8 of the 9 years in Period 3
15
.  
Table 2.5: Number of Teams in Major League Baseball 
 
  Years   NL  AL  
 1901-1960    8    8 
 1961     8   10  
 1962-1968  10   10 
 1969-1976  12   12 
 1977-1992  12   14 
 1993-1997  14   14 
 1998-Current  14   16 
  
  
                                                 
14
 1961 was the only year where the teams had an imbalance 
15
 In 1995, when both leagues had 14 teams, the AL outdrew the NL in attendance by .5%, – a negligible 
difference.  
 18 
Second, it is difficult to speculate on what the attendance growth rate in the AL 
would have been without the DH rule change. Table 2.6 indicates little variation in 
attendance growth rates in the AL across each of the three periods. The most significant 
changes in attendance growth rates occurred in the NL. The positive changes in growth 
rates from Period 1 to Period 2 (2.1% to 3.8%) were greatly offset by growth rates falling 
(3.8 to 2.8%) from Period 2 to Period 3.   
Table 2.6: Compound Average Growth Rates of Attendance  
 
     AL  NL 
Period 1 2.6%  2.1%  
   Period 2 2.6%  3.8% 




 was not included in this analysis. This is relevant to 
consider as the NL invested in nine new stadiums from 1960 to 1970 (see Table 2.7). The 
AL, by contrast, invested very little in their stadiums during the decade leading up to the 
DH ruling. Only the Oakland Athletics and California Angels moved into newly 
constructed stadiums during this period.      
Table 2.7: National League Stadiums Build From 1960-1970 
 
 Year Stadium   City, State  
 1960 Candlestick Park  San Francisco, CA     
 1962 Dodger Stadium  Los Angeles, CA     
 1964 Shea Stadium   New York, NY     
 1965 Astrodome   Houston, TX     
 1966 Busch Stadium  St. Louis, MO 
 1966 Fulton County Stadium Atlanta, GA 
 1968  Padres Stadium  San Diego, CA 
 1970 Riverfront Stadium  Cincinnati, OH 
 1970 Three Rivers Stadium  Pittsburg, PA  
   
                                                 
16
 Other variables such as populations of cities, neighborhood demographics around stadiums, economic 
growth, population growth, park dimensions, etc. were also not included here 
 19 
 
As a substitute to constructing attendance boosting new ballparks, the AL may 
have simply instituted the DH rule change in order to increase attendance.   
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It should also noted that when calculating raw attendance numbers, baseball 
experienced several meaningful strike-shorted seasons that likely contributed to lower 
gross attendance numbers. Notable strike years included 1972, 1981, 1994, and 1995. 
These strike events impacted both AL and NL teams.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TESTING THE DH/ATTENDANCE HYPOTHESIS 
 
As mentioned previously, AL owners may have believed that the DH rule change 
would improve attendance and team revenues. In addition, the DH was expected to 
increase offensive output, encourage starting pitchers to last longer in games, and allow 
aging but productive offense players to lengthen their playing careers. 
Is attendance data closely aligned with any of these variables? Considering both 
the AL & NL, analysis was performed to determine whether attendance (the dependant 
variable) is meaningfully correlated with any one of the three remaining (independent) 
variables. Offensive output is computed by runs scored per game (R), duration of starting 
pitching uses complete games (CG), and average batter age (BatAge) is used to calculate 
age differences of offensive players across periods.   
Table 3.1: Attendance Correlation Analysis 
 
    R   CG     BatAge 
 Period 1 NL    NL/AL    NL   
 Period 2 x   NL/AL    NL 
 Period 3 NL/AL  NL/AL    NL/AL  
 
Where  
• ‘NL’ or ‘AL’ alone indicates a positive correlation in the National League or 
American League only in a given period 
• ‘NL/AL’ signifies positive correlation with attendance in both leagues in a given 
period 
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•  ‘x’ signifies lack of significant correlation between attendance and the other 
variables in either the NL or the AL during a given period 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, attendance in the NL was correlated with R, CG and BatAge 
across most periods (Period 2 R being the lone exception). By contrast, the AL 
experienced no correlation in R and BatAge prior to Period 3. The correlation results of 
R, CG and BatAge in Period 3 in the AL resemble much of what was happening in the 
NL in Period 1 and Period 2.  
Could the AL have been trying to replicate NL attendance gains? The AL owners 
may have believed the NL was more optimally managing R, CG and BatAge due to the 
NL attendance growth superiority in Periods 1 and 2. As a result of the introduction of 
the DH (and possibly other changes), AL began to reflect NL-type correlation between 
attendance, R, CG and BatAge.  
In order to approximate the independent variable most closely associated with 
attendance, a fitted regression and regression coefficient analysis was performed. To 
improve sample size, the period-by-period delineation of data was dropped. Three 36 
year periods were combined into a single 108 season data set. 
Table 3.2: Attendance R-Squared Analysis 
 
    R   CG     BatAge 
 AL .0693  .7326 .1559   
   NL .0468   .7296      .1821 
 
 
When comparing the independent variables of R, CG and BatAge (Table 3.2), the 
CG data is outstanding. Specifically, the regression analysis signals that approximately 
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73% of the variation in attendance is explained by CG. By contrast, R explains only 5-7% 
of attendance. Batter Age appears to explain 16-18%. Stated differently, it appears that 
CG is most closely associated with attendance.  
Only starting pitchers are eligible for CG status. Therefore, the growth in 
participation by relief pitchers - acting as substitutes for starting pitchers - may indeed 
have had an impact on attendance. In specific contrast, CG has steadily declined since 
1901 while attendance has been on the rise (Tables 2.2 and 2.1 respectively). This 
certainly bears further consideration as the number of CG has fallen more rapidly in most 
recent years. It should also be noted that the number of CG fell in the NL and the AL at a 




Finally, several other empirical tests were run for this work but excluded from the 
final results. The first was a test to determine which important offensive statistic (runs, 
doubles, home runs, slugging percentage, and strikeouts) was most closely aligned with 
hit batsmen. The second test was to determine if pitchers’ age (PitchAge) and BatAge 
were correlated in the AL, NL or blended leagues. Further, cross-league analysis of AL 
versus NL PitchAge and AL versus NL BatAge was conducted. The results of this 
analysis proved inconclusive and did not fall within the scope of this work to explore.    
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 First difference calculations were not included here. It is likely that the CG/Attendance relationship will 
be proved less remarkable when performing this level of analysis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OTHER IDEAS TO BE CONSIDERED 
 
Approximately one percent (1%) of all plate appearances in Major League 
Baseball results in a hit batsman (BD 2006, 2007). As a result of this scarcity, there have 
been legitimate questions about the accuracy of explanation related to the DH and hit 
batsman. Some questions have been answered through the deterrence and lineup 
composition theories. Additionally, organization of micro-level play-by-play information 
has further resulted in many reasons behind pitchers hitting batters.  
Moving forward, there appear to be a number of additional issues related to the 
DH and hit batsmen that have not yet been publicly addressed and properly analyzed. The 
following are a number of suggestions for future related research on this topic.   
Who Gets Hit 
 
A first area of consideration is simply a consideration of which batters get hit? 
Does data show that as batter quality increases, they are more likely to be plunked? A 
logical conclusion would be that the higher the OPS (on base percentage plus slugging 
percentage), the lower the cost of hitting a batter. Assuming pitchers are logical in their 
choices of plunking, they should choose higher OPS batters to hit, decreasing the cost of 
their behavior. Is this the case? Additionally, it may be interesting to compare the NL and 
AL offenses and hit batsmen. Specifically, as the two leagues have converged in 
offensive output (runs) in recent years, does the proportion of hit batsmen follow? 
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Batting Helmets  
 
There were three meaningful rule changes in MLB from 1969-1973. The pitchers 
mound was lowered in 1969, batting helmets became mandatory in 1971 and the DH was 
introduced in the AL in 1973. An area for further study would be the impact of batting 
helmets on hit batsman in MLB. Using Peltzman’s The Effects of Automobile Safety 
Regulation
18
 as a basis for analysis, one could determine if additional protection offered 
to batters contributed to riskier behavior. Using Peltzman’s conclusions as a predictor of 
behavior, one would assume that batters and pitchers would both engage in riskier 
behavior post-batting helmets. More specifically, pitchers should be observed hitting 




Designated Hitter Return on Investment 
 
The cost of employing a designated hitter may be more expensive than employing 
additional relief pitchers or substituting pinch hitters. As the DH position has developed 
over the years, it has become one of the most highly compensated on team payrolls. 
Further study into this topic would consider team profitability prior to and after the 1973 
DH ruling. In other words, has the hiring of a player to fill the DH position offered a 
positive return on investment for AL owners?  
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 Peltzman, Sam “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation”, Journal of Political Economy, 1975, vol. 
83, no 4, pp 677-724 
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 “Warnings to pitchers about hitting batter stir up controversy” (Warm Up Tosses), Baseball Digest, 
November 1, 2002 offers a brief history of notable injuries from batters who were struck in the head by 




Studies related to the impact of the DH on hit batsman have included (BD 2006, 
2007) but not narrowly focused on the impact of the umpire on the game. Specifically, 
the 1994 double-warning rule appears to have impacted the behavior of pitchers. The 
double-warning rule was intended to increase the cost of hitting a batter. It appears to 
have had the opposite effect as “NL pitchers now bear a lower cost for hitting batters and 
therefore ought to be expected to behave more like their counterparts in the AL” (BD 
2006).  Data post 1994 appears to support this moral hazard conclusion.  
One possible area to consider is the impact on offense after umpire invoking of 
the double-warning rule. After this action by officials, do pitchers behave differently? 
Does offensive production improve as a result of ejection-avoidance behavior by pitchers 
who are less willing to pitch inside to batters? Further study of this concept would likely 
include the rates of pitcher ejection in both leagues prior to and following the institution 
of the DH rule change and/or the double-warning rule in 1994. All things being equal, the 
double-warning rule should be closely correlated with higher in-game OPS rates 
following the warning. Due to the relative infrequency of such ejections, data would have 
to be gathered over a longer period of time and may be subject to heavy levels of 
aggregating.  This post-ejection data may provide a further opportunity to utilize BD’s 
micro-level data.  
Pitcher Durability 
 
With the exception of the DH, rules in the AL and NL are virtually identical. The 
DH and pitcher in the AL are assumed to exert less energy than their NL pitching and 
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fielding counterparts who must perform both offensive and defensive tasks. What impact 
does this have on the performance of the NL pitchers? One would suspect that AL 
starting pitchers should last longer in games than NL pitchers. The degree of difference in 
performance may factor into the true cost of a pitcher hitting. A relevant statistic would 
be to study quality starts by NL and AL pitchers prior to and following the DH rule 
change in 1973. Additional statistics such as earned run average (ERA), CG and 
opposing hitter OPS may provide a more complete picture to previous discussions of the 
impact of the DH on baseball.  
Also, NL pitcher fatigue may result in pitchers batting. Evidence of decreased NL 
pitching performance may be found in pitchers not holding runners close to bases 
resulting in more stolen bases allowed. (For example, Bradbury and Drinen mention the 
correlation of hit batsmen and base runners in their work.)  
Also, do NL catchers pick up the defensive slack from fatigued pitchers? Do 
catcher games caught or catcher OPS suffer as a result of their increased defensive 
responsibilities? If there shows no statistical difference in these areas across leagues, then 
one justification for the DH – marquee starting pitchers lasting longer on the mound – 
could be called into question.   
The Impact of Player Size on Hit Batsmen 
 
When it comes to hit batsmen, does size matter? In 1972, Cleveland Indians 
General Manager Gabe Paul wrote, “The stadiums and the pitchers are getting bigger” 
(New York Times 1972). While Bradbury and Drinen do not discuss pitcher size, they do 
point out that lower-skilled pitchers (as judged by batter OPS) are wilder and thus more 
likely to hit batters. Trandel, White and Klein (1998) posit that, “threatening the 
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opponents with injury to a top hitter should provide a…deterrent” and “plunking a big 
slugger is in fact standard retaliatory strategy”. What about pitcher size? Large hurlers 
such as Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson or Nolan Ryan were known as “intimidation 
pitchers” that frequently pitched inside strikes. Is it possible that physically larger 
pitchers engage in riskier behavior because their physical stature discourages one type of 
retribution – batters charging the mound? Do large hitters pose a similar threat of 
deterrence against pitchers?  
The quality and quantity of MLB data along with legions of devoted baseball fans 
should continue to provide a solid foundation for scholarly work in the impact of the DH 
in the years ahead. The above represent several directions for future study of the moral 




The DH began as a peculiar experiment at an equally peculiar place – Fenway 
Park. Nearly four decades after the decision, the DH now seems less an experiment and 
more of an institution. The DH debate remains as heated as the Red Sox versus Yankees 
rivalry.     
The Major League Baseball winter meetings of 1973 were some of the most 
memorable on record. In 18 of the 20 seasons leading up to the 1973 vote, the NL drew 
more fans and was growing faster than the AL
20
. When called to a vote, the NL team 
owners voted against instituting a DH
21
. The AL owners voted in favor of the rule 
change. The owners in the AL believed that the DH would positively impact the fan 
experience, giving a boost to attendance totals.   
More specifically, AL owners predicted attendance would follow DH-driven 
improvements in their games including the following: increased offense, in-game 
longevity for marquee starting pitchers and longer careers for aging players who could 
still be offensively productive. 
When comparing the results from the NL to the AL in these areas, several 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the AL has realized offensive superiority to the NL since 
1973.
 22
 Second, batters ages are not significantly different across leagues thus rejecting 
the idea that the AL is the exclusive home for the aged slugger. Third, starting pitchers 
across both leagues have continued to earn fewer complete games over the three periods 
                                                 
20
 In 1961, one of the two years the AL had a higher growth rate than the NL, they also had two more teams 
21
 The NL voted in favor of instituting the DH back in 1928, but both leagues were required to approve 
such a measure and the AL was against the rule change.  
22
 The most recent decade (1998-2008) has witnessed the NL offenses coming in line with the AL. Further 
study is warranted to determine reasons for such a convergence  
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in this study. From 1973-2008 (Period 3) the number of complete games saw much 
steeper declines than in previous periods across both leagues.  
The DH rule change was designed to improve attendance in the AL. When 
performing a regression analysis on 108 years of data, it appears that complete games 
pitched is more closely aligned with attendance than are batters ages or runs scored.   
 Finally, there appear to be several areas left to consider about the designated hitter 
and hit batsmen. Some of the possible options could cover batter ability, batter physical 
protection, umpire behaviors and player size. Fortunately, data is readily available to 
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Appendix 2.1b: Runs Per Game NL vs. AL 
 
Runs Per Game   
Years NLAverage ALAverage Delta 
1901-1936 4.29 4.46 0.18 
1937-1972 4.26 4.32 0.06 
1973-2008 4.35 4.66 0.31 
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Appendix 2.2a: CAGR: A, R, BatAge, CG 
 
 
CAGR Analysis    
     
CAGR ALAttend ALR ALBatAge ALCG 
1901-1936 2.63% 0.17% 0.05% -1.68% 
1937-1972 2.55% -1.17% -0.07% -1.45% 
1973-2008 2.73% 0.32% 0.10% -6.54% 
     
CAGR NLAttend NLR NLBatAge NLCG 
1901-1936 2.05% 0.05% 0.01% -2.20% 
1937-1972 3.80% -0.41% -0.10% -1.45% 
1973-2008 2.82% 0.26% 0.14% -6.74% 
     
CAGR ALAttend NLAttend   
1901-1936 2.63% 2.05%   
1937-1972 2.55% 3.80%   
1973-2008 2.73% 2.82%   
     
CAGR ALR NLR   
1901-1936 0.17% 0.05%   
1937-1972 -1.17% -0.41%   
1973-2008 0.32% 0.26%   
     
CAGR ALBatAge NLBatAge  
1901-1936 0.05% 0.01%   
1937-1972 -0.07% -0.10%   
1973-2008 0.10% 0.14%   
     
CAGR ALCG NLCG   
1901-1936 -1.68% -2.20%   
1937-1972 -1.45% -1.45%   
1973-2008 -6.54% -6.74%   
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Major League Baseball Seasons
NL Avg Pitch Age
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Appendix 3.1a: NL vs. AL Seasons – A, R, BatAge, CG 
 
Attendance, Runs, BatAge, CG      
 AL AL AL AL NL NL NL NL 
Year Attend R BatAge CG Attend R BatAge CG 
2008 34,540,540 4.78 29.0 0.03 44,083,775 4.54 28.7 0.02 
2007 35,389,158 4.90 29.2 0.03 44,095,560 4.71 29.0 0.02 
2006 34,465,295 4.97 29.1 0.03 41,578,607 4.76 29.2 0.03 
2005 33,270,923 4.76 29.0 0.04 41,644,345 4.45 29.4 0.04 
2004 32,798,075 5.01 29.2 0.03 40,224,897 4.64 29.4 0.03 
2003 30,906,711 4.86 28.7 0.05 36,723,341 4.61 29.5 0.04 
2002 30,918,426 4.81 28.8 0.05 37,025,963 4.45 29.5 0.04 
2001 32,853,727 4.86 29.0 0.05 39,727,374 4.70 29.3 0.04 
2000 31,675,798 5.30 29.1 0.05 39,683,109 5.00 29.1 0.05 
1999 31,816,532 5.18 28.8 0.05 38,322,848 5.00 28.9 0.05 
1998 32,174,363 5.01 29.3 0.06 38,426,784 4.60 28.5 0.06 
1997 31,283,321 4.93 29.1 0.05 31,885,368 4.60 28.7 0.06 
1996 29,718,093 5.39 28.9 0.07 30,379,288 4.68 28.7 0.06 
1995 25,358,988 5.06 29.0 0.07 25,110,248 4.63 28.2 0.06 
1994 24,202,197 5.23 29.1 0.10 25,807,819 4.62 28.3 0.06 
1993 33,333,365 4.71 28.9 0.09 36,924,573 4.49 28.0 0.07 
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1992 31,759,331 4.32 28.6 0.11 24,111,135 3.88 28.2 0.09 
1991 32,117,588 4.49 28.5 0.10 24,696,172 4.10 28.4 0.08 
1990 30,332,260 4.30 28.6 0.10 24,491,508 4.20 28.3 0.10 
1989 29,849,262 4.29 28.5 0.12 25,323,834 3.94 28.4 0.11 
1988 28,499,636 4.36 28.5 0.16 24,499,268 3.88 28.1 0.14 
1987 27,277,351 4.90 28.4 0.16 24,734,155 4.52 28.2 0.10 
1986 25,172,732 4.61 28.9 0.16 22,333,471 4.18 28.5 0.12 
1985 24,532,225 4.56 29.0 0.16 22,292,154 4.07 28.7 0.14 
1984 23,961,427 4.42 28.8 0.18 20,781,436 4.06 28.5 0.12 
1983 23,991,053 4.48 28.8 0.21 21,549,285 4.10 28.5 0.14 
1982 23,080,449 4.48 28.8 0.20 21,507,425 4.09 28.5 0.15 
1981 14,065,986 4.07 28.7 0.22 12,478,390 3.91 28.4 0.14 
1980 21,890,052 4.51 28.0 0.24 21,124,084 4.03 28.5 0.16 
1979 22,371,979 4.67 27.8 0.24 21,178,419 4.22 28.3 0.19 
1978 20,529,965 4.20 27.5 0.29 20,106,921 3.99 27.8 0.20 
1977 19,639,551 4.53 27.4 0.26 19,070,228 4.40 27.4 0.17 
1976 14,657,802 4.01 27.5 0.31 16,660,529 3.98 27.6 0.23 
1975 13,189,423 4.30 27.5 0.32 16,600,490 4.13 27.2 0.22 
1974 13,047,294 4.10 27.7 0.33 16,978,314 4.15 27.1 0.23 
1973 13,433,604 4.28 28.0 0.32 16,675,322 4.15 27.3 0.23 
1972 11,438,538 3.47 27.8 0.27 15,529,730 3.91 27.2 0.27 
1971 11,868,560 3.87 27.7 0.28 17,324,857 3.91 27.5 0.28 
1970 12,085,135 4.17 27.6 0.20 16,662,198 4.52 27.6 0.24 
1969 12,134,720 4.09 27.3 0.23 15,094,946 4.05 27.5 0.27 
1968 11,317,387 3.41 27.2 0.26 11,785,358 3.43 27.9 0.29 
1967 11,336,923 3.70 27.2 0.23 12,971,430 3.84 27.5 0.26 
1966 10,166,738 3.89 27.2 0.21 15,015,471 4.09 27.3 0.25 
1965 8,860,764 3.94 27.3 0.20 13,581,136 4.03 27.4 0.26 
1964 9,235,151 4.06 27.5 0.21 12,045,190 4.01 27.2 0.28 
1963 9,094,847 4.08 27.7 0.25 11,382,227 3.81 27.4 0.28 
1962 10,015,056 4.44 27.8 0.24 11,360,159 4.48 27.9 0.28 
1961 10,163,016 4.53 28.2 0.26 8,731,502 4.52 27.6 0.26 
1960 9,226,526 4.39 28.5 0.25 10,684,963 4.24 27.9 0.29 
1959 9,149,454 4.36 28.7 0.30 9,994,525 4.40 28.2 0.30 
1958 7,296,034 4.17 28.5 0.31 10,164,596 4.40 28.2 0.29 
1957 8,196,218 4.23 28.6 0.29 8,819,601 4.38 28.3 0.29 
1956 7,893,683 4.66 28.4 0.32 8,649,567 4.25 28.1 0.29 
1955 8,942,971 4.44 28.5 0.29 7,674,412 4.53 28.0 0.31 
1954 7,922,364 4.19 28.3 0.37 8,013,519 4.56 27.9 0.31 
1953 6,964,076 4.46 28.6 0.35 7,419,721 4.75 28.1 0.35 
1952 8,293,896 4.18 28.7 0.41 6,339,148 4.17 28.3 0.36 
1951 8,882,674 4.63 29.0 0.39 7,244,002 4.46 28.4 0.37 
1950 9,142,361 5.04 28.7 0.40 8,320,616 4.66 27.9 0.40 
1949 10,730,647 4.67 28.8 0.41 9,484,718 4.54 28.1 0.38 
1948 11,150,099 4.72 29.0 0.36 9,770,743 4.43 28.0 0.37 
1947 9,486,069 4.14 29.3 0.40 10,388,470 4.57 28.7 0.37 
1946 9,621,182 4.06 29.6 0.45 8,902,107 3.96 28.7 0.40 
1945 5,580,420 3.90 30.4 0.51 5,260,703 4.46 29.1 0.42 
1944 4,798,158 4.09 29.9 0.45 3,974,588 4.25 28.7 0.45 
1943 3,696,569 3.89 28.7 0.44 3,769,342 3.94 28.5 0.44 
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1942 4,200,216 4.26 27.9 0.48 4,353,353 3.90 27.8 0.44 
1941 4,911,956 4.74 28.0 0.46 4,777,647 4.23 27.8 0.41 
1940 5,433,791 4.97 27.9 0.45 4,389,693 4.39 27.9 0.44 
1939 4,270,602 5.21 27.6 0.42 4,707,177 4.44 28.5 0.42 
1938 4,445,684 5.37 28.2 0.46 4,560,827 4.42 28.5 0.43 
1937 4,735,835 5.23 28.5 0.45 4,204,228 4.51 28.2 0.45 
1936 4,178,922 5.67 28.4 0.47 3,903,691 4.71 28.3 0.40 
1935 3,688,007 5.09 28.3 0.46 3,657,309 4.71 28.1 0.43 
1934 3,763,606 5.13 28.3 0.45 3,200,105 4.68 28.7 0.42 
1933 2,926,210 5.00 28.3 0.43 3,162,821 3.97 28.9 0.48 
1932 3,133,232 5.23 28.3 0.47 3,841,334 4.60 28.6 0.45 
1931 3,883,292 5.14 28.0 0.47 4,583,815 4.48 28.7 0.49 
1930 4,685,730 5.41 27.9 0.45 5,446,532 5.68 28.5 0.43 
1929 4,662,470 5.01 28.0 0.49 4,925,713 5.36 28.6 0.46 
1928 4,221,188 4.77 28.2 0.50 4,881,097 4.70 28.5 0.45 
1927 4,612,951 4.92 28.8 0.47 5,309,917 4.58 28.9 0.50 
1926 4,912,583 4.73 28.5 0.44 4,920,399 4.54 28.6 0.49 
1925 5,186,851 5.19 28.6 0.47 4,353,704 5.06 28.6 0.52 
1924 5,255,439 4.97 28.7 0.47 4,340,644 4.54 28.3 0.50 
1923 4,602,589 4.78 28.3 0.49 4,069,817 4.85 28.3 0.50 
1922 4,874,355 4.74 28.7 0.51 3,941,820 5.00 28.4 0.49 
1921 4,620,328 5.11 28.1 0.53 3,986,984 4.59 28.2 0.51 
1920 5,084,300 4.76 27.9 0.57 4,036,575 3.97 28.2 0.56 
1919 3,654,236 4.10 27.9 0.58 2,878,203 3.65 28.4 0.59 
1918 1,707,999 3.64 27.9 0.60 1,372,127 3.62 28.2 0.66 
1917 2,858,858 3.65 26.9 0.53 2,361,136 3.53 27.7 0.58 
1916 3,451,885 3.68 26.8 0.51 3,051,634 3.45 27.7 0.55 
1915 2,434,684 3.96 26.3 0.53 2,430,142 3.62 27.5 0.54 
1914 2,747,591 3.65 26.2 0.52 1,707,397 3.84 27.2 0.54 
1913 3,526,805 3.92 26.3 0.55 2,831,531 4.15 27.3 0.52 
1912 3,263,631 4.45 26.5 0.63 2,735,759 4.62 27.0 0.53 
1911 3,339,514 4.61 27.1 0.62 3,231,768 4.42 27.1 0.55 
1910 3,270,689 3.64 27.4 0.68 2,935,758 4.03 27.1 0.56 
1909 3,739,870 3.44 27.9 0.67 3,496,420 3.65 27.2 0.64 
1908 3,611,366 3.44 28.6 0.68 3,512,108 3.33 28.3 0.67 
1907 3,398,764 3.65 28.9 0.72 2,640,220 3.40 28.2 0.76 
1906 2,938,076 3.66 28.5 0.78 2,781,213 3.57 28.4 0.78 
1905 3,120,752 3.68 28.7 0.79 2,734,310 4.10 28.4 0.81 
1904 3,024,028 3.54 28.8 0.88 2,664,271 3.91 27.9 0.87 
1903 2,344,888 4.10 28.6 0.86 2,390,362 4.77 28.1 0.85 
1902 2,206,454 4.89 28.6 0.86 1,683,012 3.98 27.9 0.89 




Appendix 3.1b: Statistical Summary 
 
Statistical Analysis Summary   
     
R-Squared     
 AL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 0.190 0.087 0.359 
 1937-1972 0.206 0.101 0.537 
 1973-2008 0.399 0.545 0.869 
     
T-Stat Intercept    
 AL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 0.932 -1.163 10.561 
 1937-1972 5.293 2.507 13.688 
 1973-2008 -2.442 -5.725 48.778 
     
P-Value Intercept    
 AL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 0.358 0.253 0.000 
 1937-1972 0.000 0.017 0.000 
 1973-2008 0.020 0.000 0.000 
     
R-Squared     
 NL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 0.389 0.268 0.404 
 1937-1972 0.111 0.454 0.726 
 1973-2008 0.605 0.572 0.758 
     
T-Stat Intercept    
 NL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 -1.342 -3.107 10.484 
 1937-1972 3.088 5.632 14.683 
 1973-2008 -5.143 -6.141 27.713 
     
P-Value Intercept    
 NL Attend/R Attend/BatAge Attend/CG 
 1901-1936 0.188 0.004 0.000 
 1937-1972 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 1973-2008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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